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THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CUSTOM IN THE HALAKHIC 
JURISPRUDENCE OF RABBI YECHIEL MIKHEL EPSTEIN’S 
ARUKH HASHULCHAN 
Shlomo C. Pill* & Michael J. Broyde** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
H.L.A. Hart, one of the great twentieth-century scholars of 
Western jurisprudence, observed that “custom . . . has a genuine 
though modest place in most legal systems.”1  Custom enjoys only a 
modest prescriptive and determinative role in most modern Western 
legal regimes where laws are largely a product of legislative and 
administrative activity, and where lawmaking is in an important sense 
designed to impose deliberate, policy-focused standards from the top 
down, and to create some measure of order in a complex heterogeneous 
society where many different customary practices may coexist.  At the 
same time, however, even in modern systems, custom is enmeshed 
with lawmaking, legal interpretation, and law enforcement in 
important ways.  Customary practices in family and commercial life 
influence policy and law-making in these areas in substantial ways.  
Indeed, law in these and other spheres cannot ignore customary norms 
lest doing so create too great a rift between the way things are socially 
and the way the law prescribes that they ought to be.  In the realm of 
constitutional jurisprudence, custom arguably plays an even larger 
 
*Senior Lecturer, Emory Law School; Senior Fellow and Associate Director of Law and 
Judaism, The Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory University.  SJD, 2016, Emory 
Law School; LLM, 2013, Emory Law School; JD, 2012, Fordham University School of Law.  
Parts of this article also appear in the authors’ recently published book, MICHAEL J. BROYDE 
& SHLOMO C. PILL, SETTING THE TABLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RABBI 
YEHIEL MIKHEL EPSTEIN’S ARUKH HASHULHAN (2020). 
**Michael J. Broyde is a professor of law and the projects director of the Center for the Study 
of  Law and Religion at Emory University.  Much of this article was written or revised last 
year when he was a Fulbright Scholar at Hebrew University or in the Fall 2019 semester 
visiting at Stanford Law School. 
1 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26 (3d ed. 2012). 
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role.  As Jack Balkin has argued, customary modes of constitutional 
practice do as much—if not more—to define the political norms and 
standards of American government, and revolutions in constitutional 
custom represent very real changes to our constitutional order, even 
absent any formal amendment process.2   
Still, different legal systems rest of different jurisprudential 
foundations.  While “genuine though modest” may well define the role 
of custom in English or American law, other legal systems treat 
customary practices—and different forms of customary practices—in 
different ways.  This article focuses on one specific example of how 
custom is utilized as both a source of law and as a means of 
determining correct legal norms in the fact of legal disagreement and 
indeterminacy within Jewish legal thought.3   Specifically, we explore 
the ways in which the late nineteenth-century rabbinic luminary, Rabbi 
Yehiel Mikhel Epstein (1829-1908) treated minhag, or custom, as law 
in the ritual law sections of the Arukh ha-Shulhan, his major 
restatement of Jewish law.  Part II begins by providing some important 
historical context for Rabbi Epstein’s Arukh ha-Shulhan, and reviews 
both Rabbi Epstein’s rabbinic career and his goals and methods in 
writing this work.  Part III next reviews various rabbinic approached 
to the normativity of custom in Jewish ritual law, and distinguishes 
between personal, family, and communal customs.  Finally, Part IV 
focuses on Rabbi Epstein’s own jurisprudence of custom in Jewish 
law.  Using examples of his halakhic decision making in the Arukh ha-
Shulhan, we show that Rabbi Epstein treats customary practices as 
important sources of law, at times even creatively reinterpreting 
authoritative formal legal materials in order to keep them consistent 
with customary religious legal practices in his own time and place.  
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO RABBI EPSTEIN’S ARUKH 
HASHULCHAN 
Rabbi Yechiel Mikhel Epstein was born on January 24, 1829, 
in Bobriusk, Russia, and spent his formative years studying rabbinic 
texts under the tutelage of the town’s Chief Rabbi Elijah Goldberg, as 
 
2 See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
3 For other treatments of custom in Jewish law, see, e.g., Michael J. Broyde, Custom as a 
Source of Jewish Law: Some Religious Reflections on David J. Bederman’s Custom as a 
Source of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 1037 (2012). 
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well as in the famous rabbinical academy of Volozhin.4  After briefly 
pursuing a career in business,5 Rabbi Epstein was appointed a 
rabbinical judge and assisted his teacher, Rabbi Goldberg, in his 
hometown of Bobriusk.6  He received his first appointment as a 
communal rabbi in 1865 when he was selected to become the rabbi of 
Novosybkov, a Russian townhome to an eclectic population of several 
thousand Jews, that included Orthodox, secular, and Hassidic 
communities.  At some point prior to his first rabbinical appointment 
at the age of 35, Rabbi Epstein married Roshka Berlin, the daughter of 
Rabbi Jacob Berlin and sister of the famous Rabbi Naftali Tzvi Judah 
Berlin, who would later become head of the Volozhin Yeshivah.7  The 
couple ultimately had five children:  Rabbi Barukh Epstein (1860-
1941), a  bookkeeper by trade and an accomplished Torah scholar and 
author in his own right;8  Rabbi Dov Ber Epstein, who became an 
important communal figure in Jerusalem after moving to Palestine in 
1902;9 Braynah Velbrinski, who was twice widowed before settling 
into her parents’ home and managing the publication and distribution 
of the Arukh haShulhan;10 Batyah Miriam Berlin, who divorced her 
first husband after only a few months of marriage and subsequently 
married her uncle, Rabbi Naftali Tzvi Judah Berlin;11 and Eidel 
Kahanov, who married into a wealthy family of Jewish merchants from 
Odessa.12 
Rabbi Epstein spent ten years as rabbi of Novosybkov, during 
which time he spent time visiting with Rabbi Menachem Mendel 
Schneerson of Lubavitch, the third Rebbe of the Chabad Hasidic 
court.13  Also, during this time, Rabbi Epstein published his first book, 
Or laYesharim, a commentary on the medieval text, Sefer haYashar, 
 
4 See SIMCHA FISHBANE, THE BOLDNESS OF A HALAKHIST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE WRITINGS 
OF RABBI YECHIEL MECHEL HALEVI EPSTEIN’S “THE ARUKH HASHULHAN” 5 (2008).  On Rabbi 
Epstein’s time in the Volozhin Yeshivah, see EITAM HENKIN, TA’AROKH LEFANAI SHULHAN: 
CHAYO ZEMANO U’MEPA’ALO SHEL HARAV YECHIEL MIKHEL EPSTEIN BA’AL ARUKH 
HASHULHAN, 57-58, 321-22, 349-51 (2019). 
5 See EITAM HENKIN, TA’AROKH LEFANAI SHULHAN: CHAYO ZEMANO U’MEPA’ALO SHEL 
HARAV YECHIEL MIKHEL EPSTEIN BA’AL ARUKH HASHULHAN, 43-44 (2019). 
6 See id. at 349-61. 
7 See FISHBANE, supra note 4, at 6. 
8 See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 198-204. 
9 See id. at 204-07. 
10 See id. at 207-13. 
11 See id. at 213-18. 
12 See id. at 218. 
13 See id. at 55-58. 
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by the Tosafist Rabeinu Tam.  While the Sefer haYashar itself is a 
relatively obscure and not well-studied work, Rabbi Epstein’s 
commentary gained the attention of many important Eastern European 
rabbis, many of whom gave the book fine reviews.14   
The publication of Or laYesharim improved Rabbi Epstein’s 
rabbinic reputation, and in 1874 he accepted a position as Rabbi of 
Lubcha, a small town on the outskirts of Novogrudok, in southern 
Lithuania.  Shortly after arriving in Lubcha, the communal leaders of 
Novogrudok offered the recently vacant position of city rabbi of their 
own community to Rabbi Epstein.  At this time, and indeed until the 
city’s Jewish population was almost completely annihilated during the 
Second World War, Novogrudok was an important center of 
Lithuanian Jewish life.15  Novogrudok was home to several thousand 
Jews; numerous synagogues and study halls; the important 
Novogrudok Yeshiva headed by Rabbi Joseph Yozel Horowitz, a 
student of Rabbi Israel Salanter and a major figure of the Mussar 
Movement; and a city whose previous rabbis included the famed Rabbi 
Isaac Elchanan Spektor.16  Rabbi Epstein continued to serve as Rabbi 
of Novogrudok until his death in 1908.  During this time, he led the 
community, delivered sermons, answered halakhic questions posed by 
local residents and, increasingly over time, from Jews throughout 
Europe, Palestine, and the United States, ran the local rabbinical court, 
and interacted with Russian authorities on behalf of the Jewish 
community.17  Most importantly, it was during his time in Novogrudok 
that Rabbi Epstein wrote his magnum opus, the multi-volume 
restatement of Jewish law, the Arukh haShulhan.  
By the closing decades of the nineteenth century, Jewish law 
had become immensely complex and difficult to discern.  The last 
major codification of Jewish law, Rabbi Joseph Karo’s Shulchan 
Arukh, had appeared over three-hundred years earlier, and during the 
intervening period, Rabbi Karo’s relatively terse and clear-cut 
 
14 See id. at 259-62.  
15 On the significance of Jewish life in Novogrudok, see generally YEHUDAH LEIB NEKRITZ, 
“YESHIVOT BEIT YOSEF NOVAREDOK,” IN MOSDOT TORAH B’YIROPAH [Hebrew] (S. K. Mirsky 
ed. 1956); See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 51-63; ELIZER YERUSHALMI, PINKAS NOVOREDOK 
MEMORIAL BOOK (Alexander Harkavy, ed. 1963). 
16 See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 65-93; see also id. at 162-66 (on Rabbi Joseph Yozel 
Horowitz). 
17 See FISHBANE, supra note 4, at 8-13.  For an overview of Rabbi Epstein’s rabbinic 
activities in Novogrudok based on allusions to his work in the Arukh haShulhan itself, see 
generally HENKIN, supra note 5, at 83-93. 
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statements of halakhic rules were the subject of dozens of major 
commentaries that sought to explain, clarify, distinguish, and at times 
disagreed with the Shulchan Arukh’s prescriptions.  Additionally, the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed a massive expansion of 
rabbinic responsa, the “case law” of Jewish law in which individual 
halakhic authorities provided extensive written responses to legal 
questions posed to them from across the Jewish world.  The Jewish 
legal landscape at in the second half of the nineteenth century was thus 
a veritable quagmire of conflicting texts, commentaries, authorities, 
and competing opinions that made determining the correct course of 
conduct on any particular question difficult for laypeople and scholars 
alike.  The halakhic uncertainty engendered by the state of rabbinic 
jurisprudence was further exacerbated by the fact that by the late 
1800s, the Jewish world was undergoing sustained and cataclysmic 
changes.  The Enlightenment had posed substantial challenges to many 
aspects of traditional rabbinic thought,18 and Emancipation and the 
gradual transformation of Jews into members of European civil society 
during the nineteenth century raised new questions about the 
interaction of Jewish legal norms with the prevailing cultural mores 
and practices of the general societies into which Jews sought to 
integrate.19  New modes of thinking and ideologies—secularism, 
historical criticism, nationalism, socialism, and liberalism, among 
others—made substantial inroads into various aspects of Jewish life 
and into various segments of the Jewish community.20  All this served 
 
18 See generally Eliyahu Stern, Enlightenment Conceptions of Judaism and Law, 215, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO JUDAISM AND LAW (Christine Hayes, ed. 2017); JACOB KATZ, 
OUT OF THE GHETTO: THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF JEWISH EMANCIPATION, 1770-1870, 142-
160 (1998); Michael A. Meyer, Modernity as a Crisis for the Jews, 9:2 MODERN JUDAISM 151 
(1989). 
19 On Jewish Emancipation in Europe generally, see PIERRE BIRNBAUM & IRA KATZNELSON, 
EDS., PATHS OF EMANCIPATION: JEWS, STATES, AND CITIZENSHIP (2014).  On the impacts of 
emancipation on European Jewish life, see generally MICHAEL GOLDFARB, EMANCIPATION: 
HOW LIBERATING EUROPE’S JEWS FROM THE GHETTO LED TO REVOLUTION AND RENAISSANCE 
(2009); DAVID ELLENSON, AFTER EMANCIPATION: JEWISH RELIGIOUS RESPONSES TO 
MODERNITY (2004); J.M. HESS, GERMANS, JEWS, AND THE CLAIMS OF MODERNITY (2002); 
Carol Iancu, The Emancipation and Assimilation of the Jews in the Political Discourse 
Regarding the granting of French Citizenship to the French Jews During the French 
Revolution, 18 STUDIA JUDAICA 89 (2010).  
20 See generally LEORA BATINSKY, HOW JUDAISM BECAME A RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO MODERN JEWISH THOUGHT (2011); NOAH H. ROSENBLUM, TRADITION IN AN AGE OF 
REFORM: THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH (1976); MICHAEL A. 
MEYER, RESPONSE TO MODERNITY: A HISTORY OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN JUDAISM (1995); 
David Ellenson, Antinomianism and Its Responses in the Nineteenth Century, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO JUDAISM AND LAW 260 (Christine Hayes, ed. 2017). 
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to challenge many traditional rabbinic responses to legal and 
theological question, and indeed raised many new and unprecedented 
questions that for traditional Jews often demanded halakhic answers.21   
The stage was thus set for a fresh reconsideration of the great 
body of diverse halakhic thought and opinion that had grown up 
around Rabbi Karo’s Shulchan Arukh during the preceding centuries.  
Rabbi Epstein set out to fill this need by writing his own 
comprehensive restatement of Jewish law, which he titled, Arukh 
Hashulchan, or “Setting the Table.”  Thus, in his Introduction to the 
first published volume of the Arukh haShulhan, Rabbi Epstein noted 
that the complexity and diversity of thought in rabbinic jurisprudence 
had led earlier scholars—specifically Rabbis Joseph Karo and Moses 
Isserles—to collect and analyze the diverse views of their predecessors 
so as to determine clear standards of halakhic conduct.22  Rabbi Karo 
recorded his own rulings drawn from the Sephardic tradition of 
rabbinic jurisprudence and heavily reliant on the pillars of Sephardic 
halakhic thought and practice, and Rabbi Isserles contributed his own 
conclusions, which drew on the texts, traditions, and customs viewed 
as fundamentally important among Ashkenazic Jewry.23   “Together,” 
Rabbi Epstein writes, “the two built the entire house of Israel with 
[their clarifications] of the laws that apply in contemporary times.”24  
However, Rabbi Epstein argues, the Shulhan Arukh was never meant 
to be the last word on Jewish law, and was instead meant to serve as a 
helpful framework for studying the law in depth using primary sources 
in the Talmud and earlier codes and commentaries.25  Consequently 
and unsurprisingly then, the publication of the Shulhan Arukh 
engendered the production of voluminous commentaries and halakhic 
texts that utilized the framework and guidance of Rabbi Karo and the 
Rema’s works to explain further, analyze, and apply Jewish legal 
norms and principles.26  As a result, Rabbi Epstein writes, “in the 
current generation . . . the uncertainty and confusion [about the law] 
 
21 See Menachem Lorberbaum, Rethinking Halakhah in Modern Eastern Europe: 
Mysticism, Antinomiansim, Positivism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO JUDAISM AND LAW 
232 (Christine Hayes, ed. 2017). 
22 See ARUKH HASHULHAN, INTRODUCTION TO CHOSHEN MISHPAT. 
23 See id. at Chapter One. 
24 Id. 
25 See id.  For other rabbinic scholars who adopted this view of Rabbi Karo’s Shulhan 
Arukh, and of halakhic codes generally, see MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, 
SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 1407-1417 (Barnard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994). 
26 See ARUKH HASHULHAN, INTRODUCTION TO CHOSHEN MISHPAT. 
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have returned.”27  Observing this state of affairs, Rabbi Epstein took 
upon himself to try to rectify and clarify what he saw as the proper 
rules and standards of halakhic practice by, as he says, “writing this 
book entitled Setting the Table, which I have set with all manner of 
delicacies.”28  Thus, the purpose of the Arukh haShulhan is simple: it 
aims to clarify the confused state of Jewish law at the end of the 
nineteenth century by resetting the crowded and messy table built by 
earlier scholars. 
In addressing each legal issue, Rabbi Epstein begins by 
presenting the foundational sources for the rule or doctrine under 
discussion in the Torah and Talmud, and traces early understandings 
of the topic and rabbinic interpretations of those primary Talmudic 
sources through Maimonides, other early scholars, other major codes, 
including the Arbah Turim, Shulhan Arukh, and later commentaries as 
well.  In doing so, Rabbi Epstein analyzes these views, presents his 
own questions and counterarguments, and his own alternative 
interpretations of the Talmud and other primary rabbinic sources, 
records points of rabbinic disagreement, and often resolves such 
disputes, takes note of customary practices, and ultimately reaches and 
defends his own halakhic determinations.29  Thus, rather than a code 
like Rabbi Karo’s Shulhan Arukh, the Arukh haShulhan reads as a 
compressive review and analysis of rabbinic legal literature on every 
topic covered, but importantly, as one ultimately interested in reaching 
practical legal conclusions, rather than just offering a digest of rabbinic 
opinions or learned study of Talmudic dialectics. 
Rabbi Epstein began writing the Arukh haShulhan in late 1869 
or early 1870, shortly after establishing himself in the rabbinate of 
Novogrudok, and continued working on writing and publishing the 
work for the next thirty-seven years, with the final published volume 
of the Arukh haShulhan finally appearing shortly after Rabbi Epstein’s 
death in February 1908.30   
The Arukh haShulhan seems to have generally been well 
received during and in the years following Rabbi Epstein’s life.31  At 
the very least, the Arukh HaShulhan’s comprehensive overviews of the 





30 For a publication history, see HENKIN, supra note 5, at 229-230. 
31 See generally id. at 248-249. 
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independence and willingness to disagree with his predecessors and 
draw his own legal conclusions, quickly made the Arukh haShulhan a 
relevant and important text—and Rabbi Epstein himself an important 
authority—in rabbinic discourses.  The fact that four of the ten 
volumes of the Arukh haShulhan were reprinted in two or three 
editions during Rabbi Epstein’s lifetime is indicative of the demand for 
these books,32 and Rabbi Epstein noted in a letter to Rabbi Chayim 
Berlin that “the work [Arukh haShulhan] is found in many places so 
that anyone who wishes can examine them.”33  Rabbi Epstein’s 
daughter, Braynah, who after being twice widowed returned to her 
father’s house around 1900 and thereafter managed the continued 
publication of the Arukh haShulhan, wrote in 1911 that “the Arukh 
haShulhan has spread throughout the diaspora; it has been sold in the 
tens of thousands throughout Europe, Asia, and America.”34  Even if 
this last description may be hyperbolic or not based on hard data of the 
Arukh HaShulhan’ s actual distribution, it is clear that Rabbi Epstein’s 
work became a common feature of rabbinic libraries and writings.   
Since it was not a simple code of clear-cut rules of halakhic 
behavior, but a complex restatement and analysis of the state of Jewish 
legal discourse at the end of the nineteenth century, the Arukh 
haShulhan was not a widely popular text among the laity.  It was 
geared towards the those who were at least competent students of 
Talmud and halakhah.  Evidence of its reception and impact is thus 
most evident in the scholarly discourses of Rabbi Epstein’s 
contemporaries as well as those of latter generations of rabbinic 
decisors.  The Arukh haShulhan is referenced numerous times in late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century halakhic writings produced 
both in Rabbi Epstein’s own Russia, as well as in other parts of Eastern 
and Western Europe, England, the United States, and Palestine.35  Of 
course, not all references to the Arukh haShulhan were positive; many 
scholars took issue with Rabbi Epstein’s tendency to ignore precedent 
and independently suggest alternative rulings based on his 
understandings of the Talmud and other primary sources.   In such 
cases, some rabbinic decisors leveled harsh criticism against both 
 
32 See id. at 287-309 (listing the printing dates of various editions of the Arukh haShulhan). 
33 Rav Yechiel Michel Epstein, Kitvei haArukh haShulhan, no. 20.  
34 haZman 2:68, 6 (19 Nissan 5672). 
35 For an exhaustive list of references to the Arukh haShulhan in Jewish legal literature of 
this period, see HENKIN, supra note 5, at 248-254. 
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Rabbi Epstein and his approach to halakhic decision making.36  Being 
the subject of strong rabbinic pushback, however, only indicates that 
other rabbis—even those who fundamentally disagreed with Rabbi 
Epstein’s methodology and conclusions—viewed the Arukh 
haShulhan as a work with which they had to contend and account for 
in their legal deliberations.  It was sufficiently well-regarded that it 
could not simply be ignored or dismissed as to those issues of ongoing 
halakhic discussion to which it spoke.  
III. CUSTOM IN RABBINIC JURISPRUDENCE 
Rabbinic jurisprudence has long recognized minhag, or 
customary practice and usage, as an important source and determinant 
of correct halakhic standards.  As it is used in Talmudic and rabbinic 
sources, minhag serves three primary functions.37  Most narrowly, 
minhag serves a law-determining role, in that the customary way of 
resolving halakhic questions or practicing Jewish rituals may 
determine which one of several competing rabbinic viewpoints should 
be generally followed on issues subject to legal dispute.38  In such 
cases, the existence of a minhag pesak, a custom to rule in accordance 
with a particular authority or in a particular way, is used to cut through 
rabbinic dispute and determine the correct halakhic standard of 
religious practice.  Somewhat more expansively, minhag is also widely 
recognized as helping to fill gaps left by other primary sources and 
methodologies of rabbinic jurisprudence.39  Oftentimes, Jewish legal 
sources prescribe only broad normative limitations on behavior, 
requiring or proscribing some specific practices while permissively 
leaving most things to individuals’ discretion.  This second form of 
custom was a source of halakhah functions to create legal duties and 
prohibitions within the sphere of discretion left open by the technical 
rules of Jewish law, thereby creating new norms and standards that 
flesh-out the open-texture of normative halakhah.40  Third, in some 
 
36 See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 254. 
37 See Broyde, supra note 3, at 1039. 
38 See ELON, supra note 25, at 898-900; Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 45a; Babylonian 
Talmud, Taanit 26b; Responsa Maharam meRutenberg, no. 386 (Berlin ed.). 
39 See ELON, supra note 25, at 901-903. 
40 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121–32 (1961) (describing the nature of open-
textual nature of law); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958) (providing examples of what is meant by the “open-textual 
nature of laws”). 
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cases, minhag creates entirely new norms and standards of Jewish 
religious practice that cut against the otherwise regular rules of 
halakhic practice.41 
Customary practices that function in these varied ways fall 
generally into three categories, each of which is more fully explained 
below.  Some customs are forms of personal religious practice that 
most typically take the form of personal ritual stringencies, practiced 
in an effort to either avoid genuine violations of halakhic requirements 
or else to express and achieve higher levels of personal religious 
piety.42  Other customs are not personal undertakings but family 
traditions.  Such practices, passed on from parents to children over 
generations, may, like personal customs, provide more rigorous 
religious frameworks for everyday life, and could also be reflective of 
a family’s unique expressions, preferences, or modes of ritual life.43  In 
many cases, what appear to be family customs are actually instances 
of a third kind of custom known as minhag hamakom, or local custom, 
which may be carried from place to place by families who retain and 
continue to observe the ancestral practices rooted in their countries of 
origin.44  Such local customs include communal preferences for 
particular rabbinic texts or rulings of particular authorities, cultural 
practices, and localized ritual preferences.  While some halakhic 
authorities have limited the scope of communal customs to those 
practices formally adopted by local lay and rabbinic authorities,45 most 
scholars—including Rabbi Epstein—take a more expansive approach 
 
41 See ELON, supra note 25, at 903-927. 
42 See Babylonian Talmud, Nedarim 15a; Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 214:1. 
43 See generally 1 DANIEL SPERBER, MINHAGEI YISRAEL 235-236 (1990).  See also 
Babylonian Talmud, Beitza 4b (“[T]heir ancestral custom is in their hands,”); Responsa 
Chatam Sofer, Orach Chayim, no. 122 (“From all this it seems that the essential law is that 
while they can nullify it, nevertheless, their children cannot nullify it.”); Rabbi Yosef Shalom 
Elyashiv, He-arot Al Mesekhet Pesachim, p. 293: 
And an individual who accepted upon himself a good custom, this 
obligates his children as it says “do not abandon the teachings of your 
mother.”  However, an individual does not have to choose all the customs 
of his father and act like it – only those things that his father accepted also 
on his children after him. 
Id.  But see Pitchei Teshuva to Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 214:5 (“A son is not obligated to 
follow the customs of his father, besides for those that the son was accustomed to after he 
became an adult.”). 
44 See Chadash to Shulhan Arukh, Orach Chayim 496.  
45 See Mishnhah Torah, Hilkhot Mamrim 2:2 (describing customs as being enacted into law 
by a vote of the Sanhedrin); Responsa Rif, no. 13; Nachmanides, Commentary on the Talmud, 
Bava Batra 144b (s.v. ha d’amrinan). 
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that gives normative halakhic weight to popular religious practices and 
settled standards of halakhic conduct, even if they have not been 
affirmatively enacted by any formal authorities.46   
A. Personal Customs 
Rabbinic authorities have generally accepted that an 
individual’s personal religious practices can, under certain 
circumstances, create halakhic obligations to observe such customs.  
The Talmudic rabbis grounded the obligatory nature of such personal 
religious strictures voluntarily undertaken in the biblical doctrine of 
personal vows and oaths, which makes certain obligatory kinds of 
formally accepted personal undertakings.  The rabbis extended the 
original biblical rule requiring individuals to fulfill their voluntary 
oaths to include self-imposed religious practices and stringencies: 
“You may not permit things to people that are in fact permitted, but 
which those people customarily treat as prohibited, as Scripture 
teaches, ‘he shall not break his pledge’ (Numbers 30:3).”47  Based on 
this Talmudic rule, numerous authorities maintain that when an 
individual adopts specific non-mandatory religious practices—such as 
fasting on certain days of the week, beginning the Sabbath early on 
Friday afternoon or ending the Sabbath late on Saturday night, reciting 
morning prayers each day at first light, abstaining from meat and wine 
during the three-week morning period commemorating the destruction 
of Jerusalem, and myriad other practices—these modes of conduct 
become obligatory by operation of an implicit vow in the form of 
personal custom.48  Thus, Rabbi Joseph Karo rules that “things which 
are permitted, but which people—knowing that they are permitted—
customarily treat as prohibited, are as if they were undertaken as a vow, 
and cannot be permitted to them.”49   
B. Family Customs 
Religious strictures that begin as personal customs that bind 
only the person who affirmatively decides to undertake them often 
achieve generational longevity as personal modes of religious practice 
 
46 See ELON, supra note 25, at 927-929.  
47 See Babylonian Talmud, Nedarim 15a; Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 214:1. 
48 See, e.g., Arbah Turim, Yoreh De’ah 214:1. 
49 Id.  
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become family traditions, passed down from parents to children.  
When an individual—especially a head of household—adopts a 
particular religious practice, that practice may thereby become the 
standard mode of religious behavior within that person’s home.  
Children growing up in households with such practices, and learning 
to practice Judaism in large part by observing and habituating 
themselves to their parents’ ritual routines, thus become accustomed 
to parents’ personal customs as normative modes of Jewish 
observance.50  What were originally personal pious undertakings by a 
distant ancestor may thereby become routine religious practices within 
particular families, as individual ritual observances are mimicked and 
adopted by subsequent generations of descendants.  Such practices 
thus become minhag avot, or “ancestral customs,” modes of religious 
observance passed down through family lines from generation to 
generation.  According to some authorities, once children become 
accustomed to regularly observing certain legally permissive religious 
practices, as a result of a household religious routine determined by 
their parents’ personal ritual customs, the children can become 
obligated to continue such practices by the same oath-based 
mechanism that originally bound their parents.51  The fact that one’s 
parents observed a certain religious stricture does not, in and of itself, 
impose a duty to maintain these traditions; however, the fact that 
children raised in a home with well-settled family customs regularly 
observe such modes of religious conduct themselves and basically 
intend to continue doing so in the future may amount to their own 
affirmative adoption of these traditions as their own personal customs.  
Rabbi Joseph Steinhardt (1700-1776) explains the mechanism as 
follows:  
A son is not automatically obligated to follow the 
customary practices of his father except for those 
practices that the son accustoms himself to observe 
once he reaches the age of legal majority . . . but this is 
not so where a son never began practicing his father’s 
good customs.52  
 
50 See generally Haim Soloveitchik, Rupture and Reconstruction: The Transformation of 
Contemporary Orthodoxy, 28 TRADITION 64 (1994). 
51 See, e.g., Rabbi Chayim ben Atar, Pri To’ar, Yoreh De’ah 39; Igrot Mosheh, Orach 
Chayim 3:64. 
52 Responsa Zikhron Yosef, Yoreh De’ah, no. 14, (quoted in Pitchei Teshuva to Shulhan 
Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 214:5).  
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Those who support the normativity of family customs rely on 
a Talmudic passage that appears to indicate that children are indeed 
bound by the personal religious strictures of their parents: 
The people of the town of Beishan had the custom to 
not travel from Tyre to Sidon on Fridays [in order to 
avoid being caught in the midst of their trip at the start 
of the Sabbath].  The children [of those who began this 
practice] came to Rabbi Yochanan and said, ‘For our 
fathers this [stringent avoidance of travel on Fridays] 
was possible, but for us it is not possible [so we would 
like to discard this custom].’ He replied to them, ‘Your 
forebears have already accepted this, [and you must 
maintain the customary practice] as it says, “Listen my 
son to the instructions of your father, and do not forsake 
the teachings of your mother” (Proverbs 1:8).53 
Some commentators read this exchange as reflective of the 
halakhic force of family customs.54  In this passage, Rabbi Yochanan 
rules that the decedents of those who originally adopted the custom of 
not traveling on Fridays must continue the practice because they were 
bound by their forebears’ prior adoption of this religious custom.  
Indeed, this Talmudic narrative suggests not only that family customs 
set obligatory religious standards, but that they do so in a manner that 
is even stronger and less flexible than the initial adoption of personal 
ritual customs.  While personal customs legally grounded in the 
concept of vows can be abrogated when circumstances change in 
unforeseen ways that make maintaining the custom particularly 
difficult,55 here, Rabbi Yochanan denies just such a request to annul 
the obligation put forward by the descendants of those who initiated 
the custom.  It is impossible for children to abrogate their obligation to 
uphold their parents’ oath-based customs on the grounds that they 
regret the original vow in light of changed circumstances because, as 
Rabbi Epstein himself explains, “were they the ones who undertook 
the oath such that they could claim to regret undertaking the 
obligation?”56    
 
53 Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 50b. 
54 See, e.g., Rabbi Chayim ben Atar, Pri To’ar, Yoreh De’ah 39. 
55 See Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 228:1-4. 
56 Arukh haShulhan, Yoreh De’ah 214:29.  See also Jerusalem Talmud, Pesachim 4:1. 
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Similar indications of the obligatory nature of ancestral 
customs are found elsewhere in the Talmud.  For example, the rabbis 
of the Second Temple period legislated that Jews living outside the 
Holy Land should celebrate each one-day holiday established by the 
Torah for two days.57  This was because, in the Jewish lunar calendar, 
months may consist of either twenty-nine or thirty days, and no one 
would know which one until the new moon—signaling the start of a 
new month—was observed by the Sanhedrin, the high court in 
Jerusalem.  Once the moon was sighted and a new month formally 
declared, the Sanhedrin sent messengers to Jewish communities, 
informing them of the calendrical change so that they would be able to 
celebrate various holidays on the correct dates.58  Since it took time for 
these messengers to bring this information to far-flung Jewish 
communities in the diaspora, and residents of such communities would 
therefore sometimes not know on which day a new month had begun 
in time to celebrate holidays on the right date, the rabbis declared that 
Jews living in the diaspora should celebrate holidays for two days in 
order to ensure that, regardless of whether the previous month had run 
twenty-nine or thirty days, the current months holidays would be 
commemorated on the correct days of the month.  Recognizing that the 
obligation to observe two-day holidays was tied to the fact that the 
calendar was once based on actual moon sightings, the Talmud 
wonders why the practice should be maintained now that the ritual 
calendar is based on lunar calculations, and does not depend upon 
messengers sent forth from the Sanhedrin.59  The Talmud’s answer is 
simple: “Be careful to observe the customs of your fathers that have 
come to your hands.”60  This ruling, which prescribes the continued 
observance of “the customs of your fathers,” even regarding those 
customs whose underlying rationales are no longer operative, provides 
substantial support for those who accept the normativity of family 
customs.61 
 
57 See Mishnah, Rosh haShanah 2:1; Babylonian Talmud, Beitza 4b.  See also Ritva, 
Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 18a; Ran, Commentary on the 
Babylonian Talmud, SukahSukah 22a (s.v. itmar). 
58 Mishnah, Rosh haShanah 2:1-7. 
59 See Babylonian Talmud, Beitza 4b. 
60 Id. 
61 See also Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 28b, which employs the same principle of ancestral 
custom to uphold a local practice of Babylonian Jews seemingly at odds with the normative 
halakhah.  
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C. Communal Customs 
While some authorities, including Rabbi Epstein, recognize the 
normativity of minhag avot, the vast majority of halakhic scholars 
contend that ancestral practices and family customs do not carry any 
independent legal weight.  According to these authorities, what may at 
times look like obligatory family practices passed down from 
generation to generation are actually examples of the third category of 
legally recognized custom, minhag hamakom, or local communal 
customs.62  For instance, those who reject the binding authority of 
family customs understand the Talmudic narrative regarding the 
residents of Beishan and their custom to not travel on Fridays63 as 
illustrating the normativity of local, not ancestral customs.64  On this 
view, those who approached Rabbi Yochanan to request permission to 
abrogate the travel restriction were not literally the children of those 
who originated the practice; instead, they were simply residents of the 
town of Beishan whose prior inhabitants had maintained a local custom 
of not traveling from Tyre to Sidon on Fridays out of respect for the 
approaching Sabbath.  These later inhabitants of Beishan found the 
custom unduly burdensome, and therefore, inquired of Rabbi 
Yochanan whether they were bound to uphold the practice in light of 
the present difficulties attendant to doing so, and given the fact that 
they had not themselves ever willingly adopted the custom at issue.  
Rabbi Yochanan’s response affirmed that regional communal customs 
are binding on the community as a corporate body; once properly 
established, local religious customs become obligatory on all local 
inhabitants by virtue of their membership in the community.   
Many other Talmudic sources reaffirm that communal customs 
are legally binding, at least on local residents, and that such customs 
can resolve halakhic disputes, add to and enhance ritual practices in 
areas otherwise left to individual discretion by positive legal norms, 
and establish proper standards of religious conduct, even when they 
touch on matters otherwise regulated by normative halakhic standards.  
The Torah, for instance, proscribes the mixing of meat and milk, but 
by its own terms extends this prohibition only to the meat of livestock, 
 
62 See, e.g., Responsa Chavot Ya’ir, no. 126. 
63 See Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 50b. 
64 See, e.g., Responsa Chavot Ya’ir, no. 126. 
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while the Torah itself does not forbid the mixing of milk and fowl.65  
Rabbis of the Mishnaic period disagreed about whether the biblical 
stricture should be extended to include the mixing of milk and foul 
since chicken is quite similar to meat and the two are likely to be easily 
confused.  While ultimately, nearly all the rabbis of the time agreed to 
prohibit the consumption of milk and fowl, at least one, Rabbi Yosei 
HaGelili, maintained that mixing fowl and milk remains permitted.  
The near-universal halakhic standard thus prohibited mixing fowl and 
milk.  Nevertheless, the Talmud concedes that “in the [town] of Rabbi 
Yosei HaGelili. . . [fowl] is eat[en] [with] milk,”66 thereby giving 
normative legal credence to the local halakhic custom of following the 
local halakhic authority, even against the near-universal acceptance of 
the opposing legal view.  Several similar passages endorse the 
localized adoption of the otherwise rejected rulings of local rabbinic 
authorities on a range of issues, including, among others, the 
performance of prohibited labor on the Sabbath in order to perform a 
ritual circumcision on that day, and the consumption of certain kinds 
of animal fats whose halakhic permissibility was subject to debate.67  
Moreover, in several places, the Talmud utilizes local customary 
practices to resolve questions and doubts about the correct halakhic 
norm by instructing, “for all those laws which are unclear . . . and with 
respect to which you do not know what is correct, go out and see what 
the community practices, and practice accordingly.”68 
The Talmudic rabbis even loosely connected the normativity of 
custom as a means of resolving halakhic uncertainties to a form of 
revelation.  Thus, when the Mishnaic scholars where uncertain as to 
whether the Passover sacrifice should be offered when Passover Eve 
fell on the Sabbath, they looked to common custom to resolve the 
issue.69  Apparently, the calendrical coincidence of Passover Eve and 
the Sabbath was a rare enough occurrence that it had not recently 
occurred.  Left unpracticed, the rabbis simply forgot the correct legal 
rule:  Does the slaughtering of the Passover sacrifice, which is 
generally a type of labor prohibited on the Sabbath, override ordinary 
 
65 See Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21.  But see Mikhilta D’Rabbi Yishmael, ch. 
20. 
66 Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 14a. 
67 See Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 14a; Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 51a. 
68 Jerusalem Talmud, Peyah 7:5.  See also Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 45a; Babylonian 
Talmud, Menachot 35b. 
69 Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 66a. 
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Sabbath restrictions, or should the sacrifice not be offered when 
Passover Eve coincides with the Sabbath?  To resolve the question, 
Hillel of Babylon, an eminent scholar who could not recall the right 
halakhic rule on this issue, declared, “[L]eave it to the Jewish people 
[to decide]; [for] if they [themselves] are not prophets. . . they are the 
[children] of prophets!”70  Ultimately, the matter was indeed resolved 
by waiting to see what, in fact, the people would do that Passover Eve, 
affirming that the widespread Jewish customs and practices of the 
people were understood to be indicative of correct legal norms. 
In addition to clarifying the right legal standard in cases of 
doubt about matters known to be governed by some halakhic standard, 
local customs can also establish new religious norms in areas of life 
left unregulated by positive halakhah.  In addition to the previously 
discussed prohibition against traveling on Fridays adopted by the 
people of Beishan, the Talmud upholds the halakhic normativity of 
ritual purity practices related to menstruation that was originally 
adopted as customs by Jewish women for purposes of religious 
convenience, but which, once adopted, became legally mandatory.71  
In another example, when discussing a variety of different liturgical 
usages that can be, and in various places are, employed during the 
congregational recital of Halel, a set of thanksgiving prayers recited 
on certain special occasions and holidays, the Talmud concludes by 
noting that the correct way to recite Halel “depends on the local 
custom.”72  Likewise, while neither the Torah nor rabbinic legislation 
formally regulates working on Passover Eve, the Talmud rules that, 
“where it is customary to work on Passover eve until midday, one may 
do so; and where it is customary not to work then, one may not do 
so.”73    
Post-Talmudic scholars have disagreed about the scope of and 
underlying rationale for the halakhic normativity of communal 
customs.  One school of thought holds that, in fact, communal practices 
as such never really create or establish halakhic norms.  This view, 
which was prominent among early medieval scholars of the Sephardic 
tradition, holds that, while local laws can be created, and while such 
local laws are indeed binding from a halakhic perspective, only formal 
enactment can create such legally valid customs.  On this view, the 
 
70 See id. 
71 See Babylonian Talmud, Nidah 66a. 
72 See Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 119a. 
73 See Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 50a. 
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normativity of local customs is a function of the more general biblical 
command to obey the judicial rulings and legislative directives of 
rabbinic authorities.74  While this biblical rule is traditionally 
understood to apply to the legal judgments of the Sanhedrin, rabbinic 
jurisprudence has long held that “every rabbinic court in its own city 
is like the Sanhedrin with respect to all of Israel,” which lends 
substantial religious authority to local practices grounded in formal 
communal enactments.75  Nachmanides (1194-1279) thus ruled that “a 
custom is only binding when the local residents or the communal 
leaders specifically and formally adopt it.”76  According to this 
approach, if popular practices carry any halakhic weight, it is only 
because widespread modes of religious conduct are taken as evidence 
of some once-formally enacted but now long-forgotten communal rule.  
The ultimate source of the normativity of such popular religious 
practices, however, remains the fact that it was formally legislated by 
local authorities.  As Rabbi Isaac Alfasi explains:  
The source of any customary practice that we follow is 
that a majority of the community consulted with the 
elders of the community, and they legislated an 
enactment with respect to some matter . . . and even if 
after many years one no longer knows the root of a 
popular custom except that it is well-established, it 
should be maintained on this presumption.77 
In other words, the fundamental normativity of any popular 
practice—even if only assumed by virtue of the custom’s being well-
established—is that the local custom reflects the community’s 
observance of some formally enacted communal norm.  A similar view 
is expressed by Rabbi Solomon ben Aderet (1235-1310), who argued 
that local customs are legally valid and binding because the fact that 
they are well-established indicates that they were not strenuously 
opposed by local rabbinic authorities, which in turn supports the 
conclusion that they are proper applications and expressions of 
normative halakhic standards and practices.78  Maimonides indicates a 
similar view, and conflates the normativity of customary practices with 
 
74 See Deuteronomy 17:11. 
75 See Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mamrim 17:11. 
76 Nachmanides, Commentary to Bava Batra 144b (s.v. ha d’amrinan). 
77 Responsa Rif, no. 13. 
78 See Responsa Rashba, no. 3:293.  See also Responsa Rosh, no. 55; Responsa Maharik, 
no. 54. 
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formal rabbinic legislation, maintaining that both forms of 
supplementary Jewish ultimately law stem ultimately from the findings 
and determinations of the rabbinic courts of each generation.79  On this 
view, the scope of obligatory minhag, and its weightiness in the 
calculus of halakhic decision making, is substantially limited in theory, 
if not necessarily in practice.  The community’s religious practices are 
legally significant and valid determinants of correct halakhic norms 
only to the extent to which they accurately reflect the prior formal 
adoption of such practices by properly constituted and authorized law 
and rabbinic communal authorities.  While Minhag is a popular 
practice per se, it does not carry formal halakhic weight. 
Another group of scholars rejects this formalistic approach to 
the authority of minhag hamakom.  This second school of thought 
maintains that the popular practices of particular communities are not 
merely evidence of some ancient formal enactment by communal 
authorities, but actually create normative obligations in their own right.  
There are several possible explanations for how and why popular 
unlegislated practices become mandatory within a given locale.  
According to some authorities, the normativity of local religious 
customs is a consequence of the Torah prohibition against 
sectarianism, which the Talmudic rabbis understood to require 
substantial uniformity of religious practice within a single 
community.80  By this view, popularly observed modes of religious 
practice in a given community become binding by default because 
normative halakhah prohibits individuals from causing divisiveness 
within the community by maintaining different practices.  The 
simultaneous public observance of different religious practices makes 
“the Torah appear to be two Torahs,”81 creates discord,82 and is 
therefore proscribed.83  The existence of communal customs is simply 
a consequence of this prohibition; since dissent from settled communal 
norms of ritual practice is proscribed as a form of sectarianism, 
established communal customs are determinative of halakhic norms by 
default. 
 
79 See Introduction to Mishneh Torah. 
80 See Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 13b-14a. 
81 See Rashi, Yevamot 13b (s.v. lo ta’asu agudot agudot). 
82 See Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Avodah Zarah v’Chokot haGoyim, ch. 13. 
83 See, e.g., Rema to Shulhan Arukh, Orach Chayim 494:3. 
19
Pill and Broyde: The Legal Significance of Custom
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
184 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
IV. THE LEGAL USES OF CUSTOM IN THE ARUKH HASHULCHAN 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the role of custom in 
Jewish law has long been an important subject of rabbinic legal study.  
Custom is a particularly important consideration in Rabbi Epstein’s 
jurisprudence as well.  Rabbi Epstein upholds the halakhic relevance 
of all three kinds of minhag discussed and gives special regard for the 
normativity of the popular religious practices of his own time and 
place, which are often a critical factor in his determination of 
appropriate modes of Jewish legal practice.      
A. Personal and Family Custom in the Arukh 
Hashulchan 
Personal religious strictures of the kind that constitute personal 
custom are, by definition, elective and personal; they bind only those 
who voluntarily undertake them, and do not bind anyone who does not 
specifically adopt such ritual practices.  Consequently, we do not find 
Rabbi Epstein prescribing the observance of various personal religious 
stringencies and practices in his Arukh haShulhan, which is, obviously, 
a work of generally applicable halakhic norms, in which such 
prescriptions would be out of place.  Indeed, as discussed earlier in 
chapter eight, Rabbi Epstein affirmatively rejects the idea that 
particular personal stringencies and pious, private practices can or 
should be generally recommended or prescribed as a matter of 
halakhah.  Still, while he does not prescribe or recommend the 
performance of specific personal customs, Rabbi Epstein does endorse 
the normativity and obligatory nature of personal customs from a 
halakhic perspective if such practices are properly undertaken.84  Thus, 
in his discussion of the laws of oaths, Rabbi Epstein, following Rabbi 
Karo, rules that an individual who wishes to engage in a certain ascetic 
or pious practices like fasting can make such religious strictures legally 
binding on himself by having the intent to undertake the practice as a 
permanent feature of his religious life, and by then actually engaging 
in the practice at least once.  Alternatively, even absent any affirmative 
intent to undertake the relevant personal religious stricture 
permanently, an elective personal practice can become a binding 
religious obligation, according to Rabbi Epstein, if it is repeated 
several times and thereby becomes a settled feature of one’s ritual 
 
84 See Arukh haShulhan, Yoreh De’ah 214:1-15. 
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life.85  While Rabbi Epstein does not recommend such undertakings 
and even goes so far as to minutely explain how a person can engage 
in occasional elective piety while also avoiding any continuing 
halakhic obligation to continue the practice in the future,86 he 
nevertheless accepts that personal custom can become normative and 
serve as a source of obligatory halakhic norms.  
Once personal customs become more deeply rooted through 
established practice over generations, however, their legal significance 
becomes more concrete.  Thus, Rabbi Epstein often invokes the 
doctrine of ancestral minhag avot to reinforce what he views as correct 
halakhic standards.  One example of this concerns the normativity of 
customary deprivations observed as signs of mourning during the 
period commemorating the destruction of the Temple.  While the 
Talmud prohibits laundering clothes during the week preceding Tishah 
b’Av, it limits this prohibition to only a specific kind of fine 
laundering, which the Talmud calls gihutz.87  Rabbi Epstein rules that, 
in principle, the Talmud’s prohibition on laundering during the week 
of Tishah b’Av does not apply in his own time and place, since routine 
modern laundering is not as intensive as the gihutz laundering 
prohibited by the Talmud.  While ordinary clothes laundering is thus 
technically permitted, Rabbi Epstein, notes that the prevailing custom 
is to prohibit all manner of laundering during the period leading up to 
Tishah b’Av.  He writes, “And since our forefathers accepted this 
prohibition [on laundering], by default, this becomes legally prohibited 
to us.”88 
Rabbi Epstein also emphasizes the binding nature of ancestral 
customs related to the synagogue.  Maimonides rules that the bimah, 
the large lectern from which the Torah scroll is publicly read and 
lectures given, should be placed in the middle of the synagogue and 
Rabbi Moses Isserles rules accordingly.89  Rabbi Epstein notes, 
however, that in his own time, some agitators were seeking to alter this 
customary placement of the synagogue lectern and instead position the 
bimah to one side of the sanctuary.90  Rabbi Epstein takes strong issue 
 
85 See id. at 214:3-4. 
86 See id. at 214:2. 
87 See Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 29b. 
88 See Arukh haShulhan, Orach Chayim 551:14. 
89 See Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Tfilah uBirkhat Kohanim 11:3; Rema to Shulhan Arukh, 
Orach Chayim 150:5. 
90 See Arukh haShulhan, Orach Chayim 150:9. 
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with this because, as he writes, “what is right in God’s eyes is not to 
alter our ancestral customs in this matter [of the organization and set 
up of the synagogue].”91  In another instance, Rabbi Epstein defends 
the common practice of using “wine” made by steeping dry raisins in 
water for an extended period of time for Kiddush and other ritual 
purposes—despite the fact that almost all rabbinic authorities have 
held that such wine is not fit for ritual use—by simply noting that “it 
is the custom of our forefathers” to treat such drinks as wine.92  
B. Communal Custom in the Arukh Hashulchan 
Earlier, we discussed two different rabbinic understandings of 
the legal impact of communal customs.  According to one view, local 
customs are only legally normative in cases where such practices have 
been formally legislated or ratified by lay or rabbinic communal 
authorizes.  A second school of thought maintains, however, that the 
prevalent modes of religious practice are legally binding simply by 
virtue of their being well-established among the practicing Jews of a 
particular community.  Rabbi Epstein is a strong proponent of this 
second understanding of the basis and scope of popular communal 
customs, and he often upholds the normativity of minhag, relying on 
the assumption that the religious practices of the Jewish community 
must not be in error, and that established customs reflect God’s guiding 
hand, helping reveal the law through communal practice over time.   
One salient example of Rabbi Epstein’s thinking on the 
normativity of popular customs involves the fundamental rabbinic 
dispute about the legal definition of a “public domain” for purposes of 
Sabbath restrictions.93  Jewish law forbids Jews from carrying things 
from the public to private domains or within a public domain on the 
Sabbath.94  While some of the characteristics of a halakhic public 
domain are defined by the Talmud, post-Talmudic authorities 
disagreed about whether there is a minimum population requirement 
for a space to be considered “public.”  According to most scholars, 
there is no minimum population threshold for an otherwise open area 
accessible to the public at large to be considered a “public domain;” 
 
91 See id. 
92 See Arukh haShulhan, Orach Chayim 202:15. 
93 See generally RABBI YOSEF GAVRIEL BECHOFFER, THE CONTEMPORARY ERUV: ERUVIN IN 
MODERN METROPOLITAN AREAS 41-50 (3d ed. 2013). 
94 See Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Eruvin 1:1-6. 
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this is in fact the more textually sound position, as the Talmud spends 
a good deal of space defining the parameters of public domains, but in 
doing so makes no mention of any population threshold.95  Some 
scholars—including many prominent rabbis of the Ashkenazic 
tradition—disagree.  Based on the fact that Sabbath prohibitions are 
exegetically related to biblical descriptions of the Jews’ desert 
encampment during their forty-year sojourn in the wilderness on the 
way to Canaan, and that the bible describes the Jewish desert 
population as consisting of six-hundred thousand military-age men, 
these authorities maintain that a space must be used regularly by at 
least six-hundred thousand people in order to be considered a “public 
domain” in the eyes of halakhah.96  The implications of the dispute are 
obvious.  The less textually justifiable minority view, demanding a 
population of six hundred thousand before a space will be considered 
“public,” makes it possible for Jews to carry things into and through 
the streets on the Sabbath, since almost no public streets are traversed 
by that many people on a regular basis, and are therefore not 
considered “public domains” where carrying is prohibited.  According 
to the majority position, however, most streets are considered “public 
domains,” where carrying is prohibited on the Sabbath. 
By Rabbi Epstein’s own time, the dominant practice in 
Europe’s Ashkenazic communities had long accepted the minority 
position that imposed minimum population requirements on the 
halakhic definition of a “public domain.”97  In his treatment of the 
issue, Rabbi Epstein expresses the following serious jurisprudential 
doubts about the halakhic credibility of the more lenient position: first, 
because it is poorly grounded in the Talmud in comparison to the 
stricter view; second, because halakhic jurisprudence generally 
prescribes that minority opinions be defeated by majority rulings; and 
third, because the minority view seems to contradict a biblical passage 
in which the prophet Nehemiah chastises the people for carrying on the 
Sabbath at a time when the local population was no larger than forty 
 
95 See Arukh haShulchan, Orach Chayim 345:14-15. 
96 See Arukh haShulchan, Orach Chayim 345:17 (noting halakhic authorities who rule 
leniently on this matter, including the Sefer haTerumah, the Semag, the Semak, the Maharam 
meRutenberg, the Rosh, and the Arbah Turim). 
97 See generally Adam Mintz, Halakhah in America: The History of City Eruvin, 1894-
1962, at 132-75 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) 
(discussing the use and justification for the construction of eruvin in early modern and modern 
Europe). 
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thousand.98  Despite these very real halakhic difficulties with the 
minority view, Rabbi Epstein accepts it as normative and valid.  He 
writes: 
However, in any case, all this analysis does not matter 
now that there is widespread acceptance [that carrying 
in the streets is permitted] in most of the cities of the 
Jewish people these past several hundred years, in 
reliance on this [minority] viewpoint.  And it is as if a 
voice has gone forth from the Heavens saying that “the 
halakhah is in accordance with this view.”99 
Rabbi Epstein exhibits similar respect for the presumptive 
validity of popular modes of religious practice in many other places as 
well, even when such practices stand in real tension with halakhic 
norms grounded in primary rabbinic texts and methods. 
The confluence of these various instantiations and applications 
of the normativity of minhag in rabbinic jurisprudence contribute to a 
broad understanding among many scholars that the customary halakhic 
practices and interpretations of particular Jewish groups constituted 
along ethnic, cultural, ideological, and geographical lines are 
important—even primary—sources of halakhic norms.  The most 
widely recognized of such traditions are the Ashkenazic customs of the 
Jewish communities of Christian Europe, the Sephardic traditions of 
Spain and North African Jews, Edot haMizrach customs of Middle 
Eastern Jewish communities, as well as a smattering of other traditions 
of Jewish custom to communities in Yemen, Central Asia, Italy, 
Germany, and Greece, among other locations.  While all of these 
varied traditions share broad commonalities in religious practice, they 
differ in important ways in the details of their respective prayer 
liturgies and practices, holiday observances, dietary laws, family life, 
and the relative importance they attribute to various rabbinic texts and 
halakhic authorities.  For most of Jewish history, and even in Talmudic 
times, the practices of each of these communities were regarded as 
normative for members of that community.100  For most halakhic 
scholars, the normativity of these distinct customary traditions of 
Jewish law and practice continues in the modern era, even as the heirs 
 
98 Nehemiah 8:7; See generally Arukh haShulchan, Orach Chayim 345:16-18. 
99 Arukh haShulchan, Orach Chayim 345:18. 
100 Cf. Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 51a.  
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2020], Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/13
2020 THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CUSTOM 189 
of these once geographically distinct communities now live and 
practice side by side in places like Israel and the United States.101 
For Rabbi Epstein, who was raised and educated in the 
Lithuanian Ashkenazic tradition, and lived and worked in Russia,102 
the customary practices and recognized halakhic authorities of the 
European Ashkenazic tradition generally, and of the Eastern European 
Lithuanian tradition more specifically, carry substantial normative 
weight.  Minhag, in this sense, is both a source of normative halakhic 
standards, as well as an honored reservoir of religious living to be 
defended in case of tension with other sources of proper Jewish 
practice. 
Customary practice, for instance, determines, for Rabbi 
Epstein, the correct manner of fulfilling ritual handwashing 
obligations.  There is a disagreement among medieval halakhic 
authorities regarding which parts of the hand must be washed in order 
to fulfill the obligations of ritual handwashing.103  According to the 
Raabad and the Rosh, one must wash one’s fingers up to the “third 
joint,” which commentators understand to mean the knuckles.104  
Maimonides rules similarly, prescribing that, for ritual hand washing, 
one must wash the entirety of the fingers, but no more.105  Rabbi Isaac 
Alfasi disagrees, however, and rules that one must wash one’s whole 
hand up to the wrist.106  Rabbi Epstein rules that the law follows the 
more lenient view of the Raabad and the Rosh, which is supported by 
the Zohar, which teaches that when performing ritual hand washing, 
one must be careful to wash “fourteen joints” on each hand, the two 
joints on the thumb and the three joints on each of the other four 
fingers.107  This supports the view that ritual handwashing must cover 
the entire finger, but need not also cover the hand up to the wrist, as 
prescribed by Rabbi Alfasi.   Rabbi Epstein notes, however, that while 
the halakhah thus does not require one to wash the entire hand, because 
the widespread custom is to wash the whole hand in accordance with 
 
101 See, e.g., RABBI ABRAHAM ISAAC KOOK, ORACH MISHPAT, ORACH CHAYIM 17; IGROT 
HARAYAH no. 576. 
102 See id. at Chapter Two. 
103 On the obligation and rationale for ritual handwashing, see generally Babylonian 
Talmud, Chulin 105b-106a; Babylonian Talmud, Shabat 13b; Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 
53b.  
104 See Babylonian Talmud, Orach Chayim 161:7. 
105 See Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Brakhot 6:4. 
106 See Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 161:8. 
107 Id. 
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Rabbi Alfasi’s view, and he therefore advises people to follow this 
more stringent practice.108 
Minhag also establishes the halakhic norms of commemorative 
mourning practices during the period recalling the destructions of 
Jerusalem and the Temples.  While the Talmud prohibits laundering 
clothes during the week preceding Tishah b’Av, it limits this 
prohibition to only a specific kind of fine laundering, which the 
Talmud calls gihutz.109  Rabbi Epstein rules that, in principle, the 
Talmud’s prohibition on laundering during the week of Tishah b’Av 
does not apply in his own time and place, since routine modern 
laundering is not as intensive as the gihutz laundering prohibited by the 
Talmud.  While ordinary clothes laundering is thus technically 
permitted, Rabbi Epstein, notes that the prevailing custom is to prohibit 
all manner of laundering during the period leading up to Tishah b’Av.  
He writes, “And since our forefathers accepted this prohibition [on 
laundering], by default, this becomes legally prohibited to us.”110  
Relatedly, the Talmud rules that “all the commandments that apply to 
a mourner are practiced on Tishah b’Av.”111  Since the Tishah b’Av 
restrictions prescribed by the Talmud are tied to mourning practices, 
the Rosh writes that in truth one should be obligated to wear tefilin on 
Tishah b’Av, since mourners are obligated to wear tefilin after the first 
day following the death of a relative, and mourning practices of Tishah 
b’Av are no more restrictive than those of mourning following the day 
of death.112  Nevertheless, despite the lack of any clear Talmudic 
prohibition against doing so, the general practice is not to wear tefilin 
on the morning of Tishah b’Av.  Rabbi Esptein accepts this custom and 
rules that, as a matter of law, tefilin should not be worn on Tishah b’Av 
morning.113  While the Talmud does not instruct that the regular 
obligation to wear tefilin is suspended on Tishah b’Av, Rabbi Epstein 
thinks that the widespread popular custom not to wear tefilin on Tishah 
b’Av morning is determinative. 
The importance of customary practices as determinate of 
correct halakhic norms leads Rabbi Epstein to finds ways to justify 
established customs, especially when those customs cut against the 
 
108 See id. 
109 See Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 29b. 
110 See Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 551:14. 
111 Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 30a. 
112 See Rosh on Taanit 4:37. 
113 See Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 555:2. 
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legal import of other sources of halakhah.  Rabbi Epstein notes, for 
instance, that in his own time, many communities had the custom to 
use various synagogue accouterments for mundane purposes.  These 
practices included using the ark curtains to form marriage canopies, 
and placing the Torah scrolls on the bima and a candle in the ark on 
the holiday of Hoshana Raba.114  These customs are in tension with 
standard halakhic rules that tashmishei kedushah—items used for 
sanctified purposes—cannot be used for other, non-sanctified 
purposes, and must be placed in genizah storage once their usefulness 
for their originally designated holy purpose has passed.115  While many 
authorities, therefore, severely criticized the kinds of practices Rabbi 
Epstein described, Rabbi Epstein himself attempts to justify the 
custom.  He notes that that Talmud itself permits the use of sanctified 
objects for mundane purposes if the items were originally only 
designated for sanctity on condition that they could also be used for 
other functions.116  Based on this idea, and in an attempt to reconcile 
the halakhah with customary practice, the Terumat haDeshen, a 
medieval rabbinic authority, and Rabbi Moses Isserles suggest that one 
may use various sanctified synagogue accouterments for mundane 
purposes even without having made any explicit conditions to that 
effect at the time that the items were initially designated for holy 
uses.117   Rabbi Isserles explains that, since it is practically very 
difficult to ensure that such items are not used for any mundane 
purposes, it is as though “the court initially stipulated conditions on 
their sanctified use.”118  While Rabbi Epstein notes that it is difficult 
to justify the Terumat haDeshen’s view that the designation of all 
synagogue items includes an implicit condition permitting their use for 
mundane purposes, and points out that even the Terumat haDeshen 
himself finds the idea suspect, Rabbi Epstein ultimately accepts this 
line of reasoning in order to provide justification for the common 
customary practice to use synagogue accouterments for mundane 
purposes.119 
Rabbi Epstein likewise defends the validity of popular custom 
in the face of normative halakhic challenges in the case of using raisin 
 
114 Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 154:11. 
115 Babylonian Talmud, Megilah 26b. 
116 See Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 154:12. 
117 See Trumat haDeshen 263; Rema to Shulkhan Arukh Orach Chayim 154:8. 
118 See Rema to Shulkhan Arukh Orach Chayim 154:8. 
119 Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 154:11. 
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wine for ritual purposes.  The Arbah Turim rules that one may recite 
the Sabbath Kidush over raisin wine.120  This is based on a Talmudic 
passage that teaches that raisin wine was even ex post facto ritually fit 
for use as part of the offering services in the Temple.121  If raisin wine 
is fit for Temple service, it is surely fit for use to fulfill the rabbinic 
obligation to recite the Sabbath Kidush over a cup of wine.122  Virtually 
all authorities include an important caveat to this halakhic permission 
to use raisin wine for Kidush: the Arbah Turim, Maimonides, Rabbi 
Isaac Alfasi, and Rabbi Moses Isserles all rule that raisin wine is only 
ritually fit for use for reciting Kidush if it was produced from raisins 
that themselves still contained some small amount of grape juice 
within them.  If, however, the wine was produced merely by steeping 
completely dry raisins in water for an extended period of time, the 
“wine”—which is, in fact, just raisin-flavored water—may not be used 
for the Sabbath Kidush.123  In light of the strong consensus of 
authorities invalidating for ritual purposes raisin wine made by 
steeping dry raisins in water, Rabbi Epstein raises concerns about how, 
in his own time and place, people routinely used raisin wine for 
Kidush.  This is problematic, he says, because “everyone knows that 
the small raisins we use to make raisin wine are extremely dry and have 
no moisture in them at all,” which renders the “wine” made from these 
raisins unsuitable for ritual purposes.124  Despite these very serious 
grounds for objection, Rabbi Epstein seeks to justify the local custom 
and therefore offers several different justifications for the widespread 
practice of using this kind of raisin wine for Kidush.   First, he suggests 
that the view that wine made from dry raisins is not legally treated as 
wine is grounded in another halakhic position held by Maimonides and 
Rabbi Alfasi but rejected by most Ashkenazic halakhic authorities.  
There is a basic dispute among early authorities regarding whether the 
Torah recognizes that the flavor of a food is considered to be the 
substance of the food, or if this principle is merely rabbinic in nature.  
According to Maimonides and others, this is merely a rabbinic rule, 
and Rabbi Epstein suggests this may be why Maimonides declines to 
treat as wine drinks made from completely dry raisins, which do not 
contain any actual juice secreted from the raisins themselves.  
 
120 See Arbah Turim, Orach Chayim 727:1. 
121 See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 97a. 
122 See Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 202:15. 
123 See Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 272:6. 
124 See Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 202:15. 
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Ashkenazic authorities, however, maintain that flavor is regarded as 
substance even at a biblical level, and based on that line of reasoning, 
one might be able to treat even water flavored by dry raisins as wine.  
Rabbi Epstein also offers a second justification for the common 
practice of using raisin wine for Kidush by arguing that the legal 
definition of “wine” actually depends on what people customarily 
regard as wine.  Since people consider wine made from dry raisins to 
be “wine,” it may be used for Kidush.  Third, Rabbi Epstein argues that 
it would be impracticable not to treat this commonly used raisin wine 
as ritually suitable wine, because in his time and place, proper wine 
was simply not readily available to most people, and raisin wine had 
to serve as an acceptable substitute.125 
In addition to the normative halakhic value of custom as a 
means of establishing proper halakhic standards, customary practices 
also create social realities and “facts on the ground” that can put 
pressure on rabbinic decisions tasked with making legal rulings to 
understand and interpret legal rules in ways that do not too 
dramatically conflict with the lived realities of their communities.  
While this will be discussed in greater detail below, in connection with 
Rabbi Epstein’s ninth methodological principle, it is important to note 
here that the de facto existence of certain modes of religious practice—
or, indeed, of normatively incorrect practice—among Jewish 
populations establishes an important data point in Rabbi Epstein’s 
halakhic calculations. 
The halakhic import of custom is not limitless, however.  Aside 
from the more skeptical rabbinic perspectives on the normativity of 
mihag discussed above, even Rabbi Epstein’s expansive respect for the 
power of customary practices and usages to establish and determine 
halakhic standards is limited.  In Rabbi Epstein’s jurisprudence, 
custom only operates as a legitimate source of religious norms in two 
ways: first, minhag can establish standards of halakhic conduct within 
the neutral permissive space left to personal discretion by ordinary 
halakhic sources and methods; and second, minhag may function to 
resolve disputes over correct standards in areas of life regulated by 
normative halakhah.126  Customary practices cannot, however, change 
the law in cases where the correct halakhic standard is clear and 
uncontested.  In such instances, in Rabbi Epstein’s words, “it is 
 
125 Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 272:7. 
126 See Arukh HaShulchan, Yoreh De’ah 214:33. 
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prohibited to follow the minhag, and we must eradicate it.”127  True to 
his methodological leanings, Rabbi Epstein grounds even this 
secondary rule regarding the scope of legally legitimate customs in a 
Talmudic norm: “Where there is a [legal] prohibition, of what matter 
is it that the people customary act [in a different way]?”128   
In several places, following this approach, Rabbi Epstein 
strongly condemns popular practices, which he understands as entirely 
incompatible with accepted halakhic norms.  For instance, Rabbi 
Epstein strongly condemns the popular practice of reciting the Kadish 
prayer multiple times during the morning prayer service.  The early 
Second Temple period rabbinic synod, known as the Men of the Great 
Assembly, legislated the recitation of the Kadish, a prayer designed to 
punctuate the standard prayer liturgy and other important occasions 
with acknowledgments of God’s greatness.  Rabbi Epstein notes that 
many communities customarily punctuate the morning prayer service 
by reciting Kadish many times, indeed, more times than the Talmudic 
rabbis themselves prescribed.  Taking as normative the Talmudic 
prescription of the correct number of times which Kadish should be 
said during the morning prayer service, Rabbi Epstein rejects this 
common custom.  While Rabbi Epstein generally treats customs with 
deference, he views the custom of reciting Kadish more than is legally 
necessary as a supererogatory practice carrying negative 
repercussions.  Rabbi Epstein notes that, according to one major 
authority, reciting Kadish, which contains God’s name, is akin to 
reciting blessings; and “just as it is good to be frugal with reciting 
blessings, it is likewise good to be frugal with the recitation of 
the Kadish prayer.”129  Thus, following the general principle that one 
does not recite unnecessary blessings, as they involve the possible 
violation of the biblical injunction against taking God’s name in vain, 
Rabbi Epstein prohibits the unnecessary recital of Kadish, and 
prescribes that Kadish should be said only at those points in the prayer 
service at which it is legally required. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Rabbi Epstein set out to write his comprehensive restatement 
of Jewish law, the Arukh Ha-Shulhan, at a critical point in Jewish legal 
 
127 Id. 
128 Babylonian Talmud, Rosh haShanah 15b. 
129 Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 55:3. 
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history.  In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the state of 
rabbinic law was complex and confused.  While halakhic 
jurisprudence largely revolved around the Rabbi Joseph Karo’s 
sixteenth-century code, the Shulhan Arukh, this text had become 
obscured by voluminous commentaries, as well as countless other 
sources that muddy the waters of Jewish law, making it difficult for 
Jewish laypeople and rabbinic scholars alike to determine the correct 
standards of halakhic practice.  At the same time, Jewish society was 
changing at a rapid pace as political, social, technological, economic, 
and intellectual developments created great chasms between Jewish 
law “on the books” and the lived experiences of large numbers of 
religiously committed Jews.  In this context, Rabbi Epstein’s liberal 
reliance on custom as a normative force in halakhic jurisprudence 
plays an important role in grounding his largely independent approach 
to Jewish legal decision making in Jewish history, religious tradition, 
and Jewish social context.  In the Arukh Ha-Shulhan, then, custom 
operates as a helpful bridge between creative and independent legal 
decision making that is largely unbounded by rabbinic precedent and 
the continuity of Jewish religious life and practice. 
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